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ABSTRACT 
The theoretical literature on patent races has been an 
interesting and fast-evolving one, moving from largeley heuristic 
discussion to quite rigorous analysis within the space of the past two 
decades, This literature has been characterized by a pattern of 
interesting results which are subsequently reversed under alternative 
behavioral and/or structural assumptions. This sensitivity of key 
results to mutually exclusive but perhaps equally plausible modeling 
assumptions has kept conclusions and policy recommendations in a 
constant state of revision, All of these papers have been concerned 
with a single innovation produced by a number of identical agents, 
This paper generalizes this literature in two important ways, 
First, we consider a market in which one firm is the current 
patent- holder the incumbent, while the remaining firms are 
nonincumbents; firms are entirely symmetric in every other sense, 
Second, we consider a sequence of innovations, so that success does 
not imply that the sucoessful firm reaps monopoly profits forever 
after, but only until the next, better innovation is developed, 
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I, Introduction 
The theoretical literature on patent races has been an 
interesting and fast-evolving one, moving from largely heuristic 
discussion to quite rigorous analysis within tho space of the past two 
decades, Early analytical models took a decision theoretic approach 
(with the exception of a game-theoretic analysis due to Scherer 
[1967]). Important contributions include Horowitz [1963], Barzel 
[1968] and Kamien and Schwartz [e.g,, 1 972, 1974, 1976], The more 
recent game-theoretic literature on patent races includes work by 
Loury (1979], Lee and Wilde (1980], Dasgupta and Stiglitz [1980] and 
Reinganum (1981,1982], This literature has been characterized by a 
pattern of interesting results which are subsequently reversed under 
alternative behavioral and/or structural assumptions, This 
sensitivity of key results to mutually exclusive but perhaps equally 
plausible modeling assumptions has kept conclusions and policy 
recommendations in a constant state of revision, For example, one 
important issue concerns the impact of increasing competition upon 
individual firm (and industry) incentives to invest in R and D, The 
1, J would like to thank Louis Wilde for helpful com­
ments and discussion, The financial support of the Na­
tional Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged, 
sequence of papers by Kamien and Schwartz [1976], Loury [1979], Lee 
and Wilde [1980] and Reinganum [1982] provides an illuminating 
exchange on this question, Interesting spinoffs of these models 
include recent work by Mortensen [1981] and Wilde [1982], All of 
these papers have been concerned with a single innovation produced by 
a number of identical agents, all of whom can be interpreted as 
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''outsiders'' to the industry. This paper generalizes this literature 
in two important ways, 
First, we consider a market in which one firm is the current 
patent-holder -- the incumbent or insider while the remaining firms 
are nonincumbents or outsiders; the firms are entirely symmetric in 
every other sense, 
Second, we consider a sequence of innovations, so that a 
single success does not imply that the successful firm reaps monopoly 
profits forever after, but rather it does so only until the next, 
''better'' innovation is developed, Using dynamic programming, we 
compute the (subgame perfect ) Nash equilibrium in a game with such a 
sequence of patent races, 
The model is developed in Section II below, Each innovative 
success initiates a new stage; within each stage firms engage in a 
continuous-time patent race, The game with t stages remaining is 
constructed recursively from shorter horizon games under the 
assumption of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium play. Nash equilibria 
are shown to be symmetric among the nonincumbents, while the incumbent 
always invests less than the nonincumbents, Section III discusses 
comparative statics and equilibrium with free entry and exit. In 
Section IV we show that, under reasonable assumptions, a Nash 
equilibrium exists for the multi-stage game, Section V concludes and 
discusses related work by Futia [1980] and Rogerson [1979]. 
II, The Model 
The multi-stage model developed below is based upon the 
single-innovation model of Lee and. Wilde [1980] ,, which is a 
reformulation of a model originally due to Loury [1979], The Lee and 
Wilde model appears as a specialization of tho model below for the 
case of a single stage and no incumbent firm. 
Consider a sequence of innovations with associated prof it 
flows of Ro•Ri•····� where Rt denotes the flow profit available from 
the current innovation when there are t innovations remaining. These 
profit flows are assumed to be known in advance; only the timing of 
the innovations is uncertain, We assume that R0 ) R1 ) • • •  > RT' 
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That is, successive innovations are becoming more profitable, At each 
stage t, a given number of firms nt are competing to be the first to 
introduce the next innovation. Firm i invests at the constant rate 
xit during the t
th stage, 2 
2. A more general specification would allow the rate 
of investment to depend upon time and accumulated in­
vestment, but under the stationarity assumptions we 
make below, equilibrium play implies a constant rate of 
investment (see Reinganum [1981]), 
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Each innovation is assumed to be patentable so that if a firm wins the 
t+lth race (that is, tho race after which t innovations remain), it 
becomes the incumbent and receives flow profits of Rt until tho next 
innovation occurs, If a firm loses the t+lth race, it loses its R and
D investment and collects no reward during that stage. Let It denote
the identity of the incumbent when t stages remain. 
There are both technological and market uncertainties 
associated with each race, Technological uncertainty takes the form 
of a stochastic relationship between the amount of money invested in R 
and D and the eventual date of success, That is, firm i is unable to 
choose its exact date of success with certainty. Rather the date of 
success associated with an investment rate of xit is 't'it(xit), a 
random variable with distribution function 
't' 8 [0,<D). 
Assumption 1, Assume that the constant hazard rate ht(xit) has the
properties that 
(i) ht(O) = 0 lim ht'(x),
x -> CD 
(ii) ht''(x) 2. (i) 0 as x i (2.) xt < m and 
(iii) ht (x)/x 2. (i) ht' (x) as x 2. (i) it < m, 
Thus there may be initial increasing returns, but eventually the 
technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale, A typical hazard 
rate function is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 
Market uncertainty exists because the remaining nt - 1 firms 
are simultaneously choosing investments of their own. Thus firm i 
innovates successfully by time• with probability 
but firm i .l!.i!!.!. by time• with probability 
Immediately upon the first successful completion of the tth 
innovation, a new pa tent race com;.•: 1.ce s. Thus C1e stages are of 
random length, with the expected length of the t
th stage being 
The method of solution for the multi-stage game is to first 
solve the game for the last stage, and then to solve recursively for 
the multi-stage games. 
Stage t 0 
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Since the last innovation provides flow profits of R0 per unit 
time, the value of being the incumbent in the last stage is 
I V0 = R0/r0, where r0 is a common discount rate. The value of being an 
N -outsider in the last stage is V0 - 0. 
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Stage t 1 
Suppose that at stage 1 (with one innovation remaining), firm 
i is the incumbent, while all other firms are nonincumbents. Firm i 
then receives flow profits at the rate R1 and pays R and D costs at
the rate xil so long as no one has succeeded. The probability that no 
firm has succeeded by time • is 
where the summation is taken over k. 
In addition, if no firm has succeeded by time •• and firm i 
I succeeds at time •• then firm i receives the patent with value v0• 
This event has instantaneous probability 
Combining these terms and discounting at the rate r1 yields 
the expected profit to firm i (the incumbent in stage 1) when i 
invests xit and the rival firms invest 
x-it = 
(x11, •• , x (i-l)l' x(i+l)l' ""' xn 1> •. Let x1 denote t
he vector 
1 
f -r1• -1hi <xk1)• I � e e [h1 (xil )V0 + � -xu ]d-c 
[h1<xu)V� + �-xil]/[rl + lhi<xu>L ( 1) 
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Firm j's payoff is symmetric except that it receives no flow profit R1 
in stage 1, 
J -rl� -}bi<xkl)� I = e e [h1(x.,)v0 - x.1Jd �J.•. J 
[�(xjl)V� - xjl]/[rl + lbi<xu>L (2) 
Definition 1. A strategy for firm k in the game with one innovation 
nl 
remaining is an investment rule xk1:{
1, 2, ,,,, n1J --> [O, oo) The
expression �1(i) represents firm k's investment rate if i is the 
Definition 2. The payoff to firm k when r1 = i and the strategy 
k vector X1 is played is V1(i, X1) as described in equations (1) and (2),
k=l, 2, • • •  , n1. 
Definition 3, A Nash equilibrium for the game with one stage 
remaining is a strategy x:1<•> for each firm k such that, for all i, 
_J, • • _ _k • 
v1(i,�l(i), x_kl(i)) 2 VI(i,�1·X-Ll (i)) for all xkl 8 [O, oo), k =
1,2, ... , n1,
The imposition of Nash equilibrium play in each state i 
implies that the Nash equilibrium of Definition 3 is actually subgame 
perfect (Selten [1975]), Thus each firm must choose an investment 
level which is a Nash equilibrium with respect to ..!!.l1 information 
available at stage t. This information consists of the stage, t, and 
the identity of the current patent-holder, i. 
Initially we will assume that a (subgame perfect) Nash 
equilibrium exists and we will characterize the Nash equilibrium 
investment levels. Existence questions are taken up separately in 
Section IV. Because of the symmetry of the firms we need only 
characterize X� ( i) for one state i. If r1 = j instead of i, then 
. .  xl (J) is 
• • • • 
such that xil(j) = xj1(i), xi1(i) = xj1(j) and
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�l ( i) 
• 
xkl(j) for kfi, j. That is, at any stage, all that matters to
firn1 k is whether or not k is the incumbent; if k is not the incumbent 
it is irrelevant (to firm k) who is the incumbent, 
Fix r1 = i, Since X�(i) is a Nash equilibrium strategy 
• 
vector, it must be that (at an interior x1 ( i)), 
� • • I [rl + Lbi (xkl)][hl '(xit>Vo - 11
• I • • - [hl(xil>vo - xil + �1h1'<xil) = 0 
and for all jfi, 
Equations (3) and (4) can be solved to yield the following 
useful relations. 
and 
(3) 
( 4) 
(5 ) 
. . 
From (5 ) and (6) it is clear that nonnegativity of vt(i, X1) 
· • • I • I and Vi(i, X1) requires h1•(x11>v0 -
1 LO and h1•(xj1>v0 - 1 LO,
respectively. 
An alternative simplification of (3)-(4) yields 
and for all j#i, 
and 
• Second-order necessary conditions for a maximum at x1 are 
2 i 2 a v1/axil 
for JH, 
=�"<xuHr1v0+ hi<xu>v0+
• I � • I 
k i 
• 
- �] i 0 xil 
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( 6) 
( 7) 
(8) 
( 9) 
2 . 2 a Vil axJ1 
• I � • I 
= �"(xjl)[rlVO + k j
hi<xu>vo + 
• 
xjl] i o. (10)
Since h1•(x) L 0 for all x and r1 + lhi(xkl) > 0 , equations (7) and 
. . . -(8) imply that h1"(xil) i 0 and h1"(xjl) i 0, That is, xil l x1 and
• x1j l x1, Thus all firms operate their R and D technologies in the 
decreasing returns portion of the technology production function 
Proposition 1. Under assumption 1, any Nash equilibrium in the game 
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with one stage remaining is symmetric among the nonincumbents, That 
Proof, Fix 11 = i and suppress the argument Define the 
function 
gjl (xjl) hi '(xjl)[rl v� + 
• I - �'<xuHr1v0 + (
11) 
• • Equation (8) implies that gjl(xjl) = 0, Moreover, gj1(x�1) = 0 by 
inspection of equation (11), Since x;1 l �l' x;1 l �l' and 
= h1"(x.1>£r1v� + } hi(x:1>v� +J k�j 
• I 
+ hl , ( x j 1)[
1 - hi , ( XH) v 0] < 0
for all xjl ) xl' it follows that x;1 (i) = x;1 (i) for all j, Fi. 
Denote this common value by �l' 
Proposition 2. Under assumption 1, at a Nash equilibrium the 
incumbent invests less than each nonincumbent, That is, 
Proof, Again suppress the argument i, Define the function 
Q,E,D. 
• From equations (7) and (8), gi1(xi1) = 0, while 
• • gil(xj1> = -�bi'(xj1> < 0, For all xil > xl' equations (9) and (6) 
imply that 
h111<xuHr1v� + ) bi(x�1>v� +k�i 
+ � I ( X i1)[1 - hi I ( X; 1 ) V�] ( 0• 
• • Since both xii and xjl 
• Defining x11 = xi1(i), 
- . . 2. x1, it follows that xil (i) < xjl (i).
we have x11 < xNl' 
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0,E,D. 
Proposition 3, Each firm would !)refer to be the incumbent rather than 
a nonincumbent. 
I ' • N j • Proof, Let V1 = Vt(i, X1(i)) and v1 = V1(i, X1(i)), j#i, Then 
equations (5 ) and (6) imply that v: = [h1•(x11>v� - l]/�'(x11) and
V� = [h11(xN1)V� -
1]/�'(xN1), Since the function
Ch1•(x)V� - l]/�'(x) is decreasing in x for x 2. Xi and since 
�1 ) XI1 L Xl 1 it follows that \'� ) V�, 
This completes the analysis of the game with one stage 
O,E,D, 
remaining, This game is compDred with the original symmetric game of 
Lee and Wilde in Section Ill, Section III also discusses comparative 
static effects, To summarize tho results of this section, we note 
that any Nosh equilibrium is characterized by two numbers, (xil'xN1), 
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where x11 is the rate of investment by the incumbent and xNl is the 
rate of investment by each of the remaining n1 - 1 nonincumbents. The 
incumbent always invests less, x11 < xNl' and each 
to be the incumbent rather than a nonincumbent, v: 
Stage t 2 
firm would prefer 
N v1.
Again let the current incumbent be firm i (12 = i), Assuming
that play in the one-stage game is as described in the previous 
section, the value of the two-stage game to the incumbent firm i is 
Firm i receives v: at time � if i succeeds at time � and no 
other firm has yet done so; firm i receives V� at time � if any other 
firm succeeds first at time �; finally, the incumbent firm i receives 
flow profits of R:z and incurs R and D costs of xi2 so long as no firm 
has succeeded, Firm j's payoff is again symmetric except for the flow 
revenue term R:z,
· 1 -r2� -2bz<xt2>� I ) N ViCi, X2) 
&
e e [h2(xj2>v1 + k�jhz<
xk2)v1 - xj2Jd�
= [h2Cxj2>v: + k�jbzCxk2)V� - xj2]/[r2 + Lhz<xt2>J.
Imposing the property of subgame perfectness (Selten [1975 ]) 
implies that, from stage 1 on, firms must follow the Nosh equilibrium 
behavior described in the preceding section, Thus the continuation 
values v:, V� are independent of actions taken at stage 2.
13 
Definition 4. A strategy for firm k in the game with two innovations 
n2 
remaining is an investment rule xk2:{1, 2, • • •• nzl �> co.�> The 
expression �2(i) represents firm k's investment rate if i is the 
current incumbent. 
Again, symmetry suggests that �2(j) = xk2( i) for all kFi, j. 
That is, firm k will invest the same amount regardless of the identity 
of the incumbent so long as firm k itself is not the incumbent. 
Definition 5. The payoff to firm i in the game with two innovations 
remaining when 12 = i and the strategy vector x2 is played is 
v;(i, X2). The payoff to firm l (j#i) is vJ(i, X2) as described above.
Definition 6 .  A Nash equilibrium for the game with two stages 
remaining is a strategy xk2(•) for each firm k such that, for all i, 
for all xk2 e co.�>. k = 1, 2, • • •• nz. 
F" I • . 1x 2 = i and suppress tl1e dependence of x2 ( 1) on i. Since 
• 
X2 is a Nash equilibrium strategy vector, the following conditions 
• must hold simultaneously (for interior X2): 
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and, for all j# i, 
= o. (14) 
Following the analysis of the preceding section, equations (13) and 
(14) imply that 
(15) 
and 
( 16 )  
Nonnegativity of profits implies that h2•(x�2>v: - 1 2.. 0 and
• I h2•(xj2>V1 -
1 2.. O. An alternative simplification of (13) and (14)
yields 
h , • )[ I ) • I N • 2 (xi2 r2V1 + k�i
hz(xk2H V1 - Vl) + xi2 - Hz1 (
17) 
and, for all j#i, 
(18) 
Comparison of (17) and (18) with their one-stage counterparts (7) and 
(8) shows that (17) and (18) include an extra term -- - ) hz(x:2>V� 
k�i 
and -
k
�
j
hz(x:2>v�, respectively -- which reflects the impact of future
benefits which are possible even if the firm fails in the current 
stage, 
Second-order necessary conditions for a maximum are 
and, for j#i, 
Since r2 + lbi(x:2) ) 0, equations (17) and (18) imply that
firms operate in the decreasing returns portion of�( ). 
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(19) 
(20) 
Assumption 2. There exists x� such that h2(x�)Cvf - V�) - x� L r2v�.
Proposition 4. Under assumptions 1 and 2, any Nash equilibrium in the 
two-stage game is symmetric among the nonincumbents. That is, 
Proof. Define the function 
gj2(xj2) 
Equation 
bi '(xj2)[r2 v: +
• I h2'(xR.2)[r2Vl +
(18) implies that 
� • I N 
k j 1ii
<x12><V1 - Vl) + xj2J
l • I N ( bi(xk2) + h2(xj2))(Vl - Vl) kft.J 
• • gj2(xj2) = 0 and gj2(x£2) = 0 by 
of (21), For all xj2 ) X2 ' h2 ' ' ( X j 2 ) < o. Differentiating 
• (21) + X92 
inspection 
(21) 
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yields 
(22) 
The first term is negative for xj2 ) x2, while equation (
16 )  implies
that the second term is 
_ _t • N This term is nonpositive so long as v2(i,X2) L vl. By the definition
of v;(i, X; ) as the 
a sufficient condition for v;(i, X; ) L V� is that there exists some x� 
such that h2(x�)(V: - V�) - x� L r2�. But this is the content of
Assumption 2. Thus gj2•(xj2) < 0 for xj2 ) x2, Therefore, for
xj2 > x2, gj2(•) is monotone decreasing, Since 
. . . - . -gj2Cxj2> = gj2Cxt2) = 0 and both xj2 L x2 and xR,2 l x2, we have 
• • 
xj2 = xR,2' Denote this common value by �2, 
Q. E, D, 
Proposition 5. Under assumptions 1 and 2, the incumbent invests less 
than nonincumbents in the game with two innovations remaining. That 
Proof. Define the function 
Differentiating gi2Cx12> yields 
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(24) 
The first term is negative for xi2 > x2 while the second term is 
nonpositive under assumption 2 (see the proof of Proposition S), 
Since x:2 2. �2, x;2 2. x2, gi2cx:2> = 0, gi2cx;2> = -��'(x;2> < 0 and 
• • gi2( ) is monotone decreasing, it follows that xi2 > xj2' That is, 
Q,E, D. 
The essential content of Assumption 2 is that, under Nash 
equilibrium play in the second stage, profits to a nonincumbent, 
V� = V� (i,X; (i)), exceed profits to a nonincumbent when only one 
N N 1 innovation remains, That is, V2 2. v1• While this seems extreme y 
plausible, I have been unable t\: derive it as a result. 
Proposition 6. Under assumptions 1 and 2, each firm would prefer to 
be the incumbent in stage 2 titan a nonincumbent. That is, v� > v�. 
Proof, VI 2 
V� = [h2•(xN2)v: - 1] /h2•(xN2), Since the function 
Ch2 '(x)V: - 1]/� '(x) is decreasing in x for x 2. x2 and since 
I N 
XN2 > XI2 2. x2' it follows that V2 > v2. 
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Q, E, D. 
Stage t 
The results of the preceding section in no way depended on the 
fact that two stages remained, These results are valid (under the 
analogous assumptions) if we replace ''2'' with ''t'' and ''1'' with 
I I t-1, 1 I 
Proposition 7. Nash equilibrium play in the game with t innovations 
remaining is characterized by xlt' the rate of investment by the
incumbent, and �t' the rate of investment by each nonincumbent,
These rates can be ordered as follows: xNt ) x1t 2. xt' Thus the
nonincumbent invests more than the incumbent, but both firms operate 
in the decreasing returns portion of ht(•), Each firm would prefer to
be the incumbent in stage t than to be a nonincumbent in stage t, 
Proposition 8. v! < v!-l for all t, That is, the value of being the 
incumbent is greater the smaller the number of remaining innovations, 
Proof, By equation (15), v! 
Q, E, D. 
The model described above may be extended backward recursively 
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for an indefinite number of innovations, or closed off with a 
symmetric stage game which represents the ''first'' innovation. It is 
clear that this stage game fits the analysis of the t-stage game with 
Rt set equal to zero, Then Proposition 4 implies that any Nash 
equilbrium will be symmetric, 
III. Comparative Statics 
Determining the impact of various parameters upon the values 
of Nash equilibrium strategies is always difficult, since there are 
both direct effects and indirect effects through the equilibrium 
conditions, We will make one additional assumption below in order to 
sign the comparative statics effects. We will subsequently argue that 
there are compelling reasons for our particular assumption, 
The pair (xlt'xNt) are jointly determined as functions of the
parameters rt,Rt,v!_1,v�:1 and nt by the t-period analogs of the 
first-order conditions (17) and (18), 
and 
ht'(xlt)[rtv !-1 + (nt - l)ht(xNt><v!-1 - v�-1) + XIt - Rt] 
- rt - ht(xlt) - (nt - l)ht(xNt) = 0 (25) 
(26) 
Totally differentiating equations (25) and (26) and solving 
yields the matrix of comparative static effects, [dxltl r-1J ldt -bt] dxN� �� �ct at 
where Mt = atdt - btct' and 
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I I N at = ht''(xit)[rtVt-1 + (nt - l)ht(1Nt)(Vt-1 - vt-1) + 1It - Rt] < 0 
bt ht'(xlt)(nt - l)[ht'(xNt)(v!-1 - v�-1> - 1) L 0 
ct ht'(xit)[ht'(xNt><v!-1 - v�-1> - 1) L 0 
dt ht''(xNt)[rtv!-1 + (ht(xit) + (nt - 2>ht(xNt))(V!-1 -
I N 
+ ht'(xNt)(nt - 2)[ht'(xNt)(Vt-1 - Vt-1) - l]. 
The inequalities at ( O, bt l 0 and ct l 0 follow from equation (19), 
assumption 2 and assumption 2, respectively. Expression dt is not 
signable from previous assumptions, since the first term is negative 
by equation (20), while the second term is nonnegative under 
assumption 2. The remaining terms are 
alt = ht' (xlt>v!-1 - 1 l o  b y  equation (15) 
aNt = ht' (xNt>v!-1 - 1 l o  by equation (16) 
Pit = -ht'<x1t> < o, PNt = 0 
0It = ht' (xlt) [rt+ (nt - l)ht(xNt)] > 0 
0Nt = ht'(xNt)[rt + (nt - 2)ht (xNt) + ht (xlt)] > 0 
Yit = ht(xNt)[ht' (xit)(V!-1 N vt-1> - 1) 10 by assumption 2 
YNt = ht(xNt) [ht' (xNt) <v!-1 - N vt-1> - 11 l o  by assumption 2 
and 
Consider first the comparative statics of xNt' 
axNt/aRt = (ctllit - atJlNt)/Mt; thus sgn axNt/aRt = -sgn Mt'
I 
= (ctl\lt - 8t11Nt)/Mt; 
I axNt/avt-1 
thus sgn axNt/aVt-l 
sgn 
axNt/ant = (ctylt - atyNt)/Mt; thus sgn axNt/ant = sgn Mt. 
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Mt, 
axNt/a�-1 = (ct8It - at8Nt)/Mt; N thus sgn axNt/aVt-l = -sgn Mt, 
The expression Mt is also not signable from previous 
assumptions, However, from the comparative statics expressions for 
�t above, it seems only reasonable that Mt > O. In particular, it 
I seems almost a requirement for stability that axNt/avt-l 
> 0 and 
axNt/a�-l < 0, That is, an increase in the value of winning (losing) 
the current race results in an increase (a decrease) in the 
nonincumbent's rate of investment, In addition, the fact that 
axNt/ant > 0 agrees with the Lee and Wilde result for their symmetric 
game, While the opposite sign pattern cannot be ruled out on the 
basis of the previous analysis, it is not likely to be pervasive, 
Assumption 3, Mt > 0, 
Proposition 9. Under assumptions 1, 2 and 3, the investment rate of 
nonincumbents, �t' increases with an increase in the discount rate 
(rt), the value of being the incumbent next period (V�_1), and the 
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number of firms in the industry (nt), The investment rate of the 
nonincumbents decreases in response to en increase in the flow profit 
associated with the current innovation (Rt) or the value of being a 
N 
nonincumbent next period (Vt_1>. 
Since Mt > 0 implies that dt i 0, we can also sign the 
comparative static effects of parameter changes on xit'
Proposition 10. Under assumptions 1, 2 and 3, the incumbent' a rate of 
investment increases with an increase in 
value of being the incumbent next period 
the discount rate (rt), the 
I (Vt_1>, and the number of 
firms in the industry (nt). The incumbent's rate of investment 
decreases in response to an increase in the flow revenue associated 
with the current innovation (Rt) or an increase in the value to being 
a nonincumbent in the next stage (V�_1), That is, 
axit/art = -(dtait - bt�t)/Mt > 0, 
axit/aRt = -(dtJlit - btJlNt)/Mt < O, 
I - ( axit/aVt-1 - -
dt11It - bt11Nt)/Mt > O,
axit/ant = -(dtyit - btYNt)/Mt > o, and 
axit/a�-1 -(dt8It - bt8Nt)/Mt < O,
With these comparative statics results in hand, we can compare 
the game with one stage remaining (in which there are one incumbent 
and n1 - 1 nonincumbents) to the original Lee and Wilde model in which 
R1 = O and all firms are identical. Since axI1/aRi < 0 and 
8xN1/aRi < 0, both xil and xNl are less than the symmetric equilibrium 
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rate of investment in the Lee and Wilde case, 
Another question of interest is whether firms invest more or 
less on a � innovation when there are more innovations remaining, 
That is, we want to fix an innoyation. which is characterized by the 
profit flow R and tho technology production f':nction h(•), and fix n, 
and ask whether x1t 
and �(t-l)' Since 
and xNt are greater, smaller or equal to xl (t-l)
I I N N 
Vt-l > Vt and Vt-l < Vt
' the comparative statics 
results above imply that firms would invest less on the.!.!!!!!!. 
innoyation if there were more innovations remaining, 
One can accomodate entry and exit in this model by allowing nt 
to be determined by a zero profit condition, Since firms can only 
enter as nonincumbents (and the incumbent would be the last to exit), 
we need only consider V�. Define n� to be the value of nt such that 
V� = 0, Assuming entry and exit in future stages keeps 
V
N N o o) o o) t-l = O, • •  , v1 = 0, the expressions �t = xNt(nt and x1t = x1t (nt 
are implicitly defined by 
Th o i d i o ) I o en �t s of nod by ht(xNt Vt-l - xNt = 0, From equation (16), it 
must also be that ht'(x�t>v!_1 1. Combining these two equalities 
gives ht(x�t) - x�tht'(x�t) = O. But this is true only when x = it, 
Thus x�t xt' 
Proposition 11, In a Nash equilibrium with initial increasing returns 
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and free entry and exit, the nonincumbents invest at efficient scale 
(i. e., maximum average product); the incumbent invests at less than 
efficient scale, 
It is interesting to compare this with the results of Loury 
(1979] and Lee and Wilde (1980]. These two models are identical 
except for the specification of R and D costs, Assuming that R and D 
costs are contractual, Loury showed that in a symmetric Nash 
equilibrium with free entry all firms invest at loss than efficient 
scale, Assuming that firms pay R and D costs only until some firm is 
successful, Lee and Wilde showed that in a symmetric Nash equilibrium 
with free entry all firms invest precisely at efficient scale, This 
model also assumes that R and D investment is made only until some 
firm succeeds with tho next innovation, We find the hybrid result 
that while nonincumbents invest at efficient scale, the incumbent 
invests at less than efficient scale, 
Although the equilibrium number of firms will not be exactly 
n� due to the integer requirement, Proposition 11 will be
approximately true, and V� will be approximately zero, Under these 
circumstances, Assumption 2 is not particularly restrictive when there 
is free entry and exit. 
IV. Existence of Nash Equilibrium 
Proposition 12, 
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for the t-stage game, Moreover, 
the Nash equilibrium satisfies the first-order conditions. 
The proof will proceed via a series of lemmas. 
Lemma 1. Under the hypotheses of Proposition 1 2, xjt i xjt < �.
regardless of x-jt' j = 1 ,2,,,,,nt' 
Proof. First let j = i. 
where 
" m - A A Define xit = max {xt,xt,xt) where ';:t is as in assumption l(iii); 
xt min{x 2. xt ht'(x) 
I i 1/(Vt-l - Rt/rt)) and " 
" I N xt min{x 2. xt ht'(x) i l/(Vt-l v t-1>). The values 
exist and are unique because ht'(x) is continuous and 
" 
xt and 
Then we claim that i would never choose 
xit ) x�t' To see this, note that f it(x�t) i 0 and 
" 
" 
xt 
for all xit) x�t because ht' '(x) < O for all x) x t' and rtv!_1 Rt 
m i/ by hypothesis. Thus if xit ) xit' then avt axit < 0 for all x-it' 
Therefore, any xit which would be chosen would be no greater than x�t 
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regardless of x-it' A similar argument regarding xjt yields 
" m {-
" 
xjt =max x t,xt), but requires no additional assumptions, 
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Q.E,D, 
Lemma 2. v{(i,xjt'x-jt) is single-peaked in xjt for all x-jt' j 
1,2, • • •  ,nt• 
Proof, First let j i. Recall that 
I Since rtvt-l Rt by hypothesis, fit is first increasing, then 
decreasing in xit (for all x-it) under the assumption that 
ht''(x) 2. (i) 0 as x 2. (i) x t' Since fit(O,x_it) 2. 0 and 
m fit(xit'x-it) i 0 for all x-it' fit is first positive, then negative. 
i i Since sgn avt/axit sgn fit' Vt is first increasing, then decreasing 
in xit for all x-it' Under the hypotheses of Proposition 11, 
av!(i,O,x_it)/axit 2. 0, for all x-it' From Lemma 1 we know that 
av!(i,x�t.x-it)/axit i 0 for all x-it' Thus v! is single-peaked in 
xit (for all x-it). A similar argument establishes the result for
JH. 
Q,E,D. 
Figure 2 
Note that v{ will typically not be concave in xjt' If it were, wo 
could simply apply the existence result for concave games in Rosen 
[19 65). 
Proof of Proposition 12. Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that v{ is single­
peaked in xjt and has a unique maximizer 6jt(x_jt) which always lies 
nt
-1 
in the interval [O,xjtJ for ench x-jt e[O,m) Thus we can, 
without loss of generality, restrict x-jt to x co,x:t1. This kFj 
maximizer 6jt is a continuous fll!'.'Otion of x-jt by the theorem of the 
nt 
maximum. Then the vector mapping ot = (okt)k=l map
s the compact, 
nt 
convex, nonempty set X [o,X:tJ into itself continuously. Brouwer's k=l 
theorem implies tho existence of a fixed point for 6t' This fixed 
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point is a Nash equilibrium for tho game with t stages remaining, and 
it satisfies the first-order conditions, 
Q,E,D, 
V. Conclusions and Related Literature 
We have developed a model of patent races with a sequence of 
innovations, Each innovative success initiates a new stage; within 
each stage firms engage in a continuous-time patent race, The game 
with t stages remaining is built up recursively from shorter horizon 
games under the assumption of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium play, 
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We have shown that, under reasonable conditions, a Nash equilibrium 
exists for the t-stage game, The value of the t-stage game to the 
incumbent exceeds the value of the t-stage game to the nonincumbents, 
A Nash equilibrium is symmetric among tho nonincumbents while the 
incumbent always invests less than each nonincumbent, Thus the 
incumbency will tend to change hands more frequently than by random 
selection -- at each stage t tho incumbent has less than a 1/nt chance 
of being tho incumbent in the next stage, Thus instead of the 
industry becoming dominated by a single innovator, this model suggests 
an industry which, in equilibrium, is characterized by frequent upsets 
of the current monopolist, 
In addition to tho single-innovator models mentioned earlier, 
there are two other multi-stage models which are related to this work, 
The first of these is Futia [1980], Futia presents a discrete-time 
model with at most one successful innovation per period, The R and D 
model is not central to the purpose of Futia's paper, but is used only 
to provide a choice-theoretic basis for the analysis of the stochastic 
process which is assumed to summarize aggregate inventive activity 
over time, The model is symmetric in the sense that all firms are 
incumbents -- any innovation is adopted by all firms who remain in tho 
industry, Under the assumption that 
Pr[firm i succeeds with tth innovation} = xit/lxkt' 
the Nash equilibrium for each stage game is symmetric, As Futia 
remarks, the assumption of rapid imitation ''prevents this theory from 
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describing a world in which there i� a perfect patent.'' 
Another discrete-time model, due to Rogerson [1979], describes 
a stochastic game where at each stage firms compete for the right to a 
monopoly franchise in the subsequent stage, This could be interpreted 
as a game of R and D competition with patents (though Rogerson does 
not propose this interpretation). There are one incumbent and a 
number of nonincumbents. The incP.mbent is assumed to have an 
advantage which arises solely because of its incumbency. It is 
stage t and hence the reward to tho incumbent over that length of 
time -- is affected by investment by tho incumbent in stage t, 
Greater investment tends to shorten the length of the tth stage 
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because it hastens the discovery of the next innovation and hence the 
beginning of the next stage. In this case, we get our result that tho 
incumbent invests less than the nonincumbents, since the incumbent has 
relatively less incentive to shorten the length of its tth_stage
incumbency. 
assumed (in our notation) that Finally, recent work by Kamien and Schwartz [ 1980] suggests 
Pr(incumbent i wins at t} 
while 
Pr(nonincumbent j wins at t] ; xjt/[pxit + k
�
i
�t], 
where p 2. 1 represents the incumbent's advantage. For p > 1, there 
exists a Nash equilibrium in which the nonincumbents invest the same 
amount, while the incumbent invests more than each nonincumbent. This 
is because the marginal effectiveness at producing likelihood of 
winning is higher for the incumbent than for a nonincumbent when 
P > 1. If P ; 1, then there is no incumbent advantage and the 
equilibrium is symmetric. This still contrasts with our results. The 
reason is as follows. In Rogerson's model (with p; 1), the length of 
each stage is fixed at one unit of (discrete) time. The reward at 
stage t is independent of investment at stage t, which only affects 
the expected reward nt the next stage, In our model, the length of 
that these results may be extendable to a more general class of 
distribution functions than the exponential distribution, This would 
seem to be an appropriate avenue for further research. 
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APPENDIX 
Cooperatiye Inyestment 
In this section, we examine the rates of investment which 
would be selected if firms coordinated their investment decisions so 
as to maximize joint profits, denoted v:(xt)' Again we define the t­
stage problems recursively, beginning wHh t = 0, 
Stage t = 0 
When no innovations remain, joint profit is simply monopoly 
profit on the last innovation: VS 0 v
i 
0 
Stage t 1 
When one innovation remains, joint prof its are simply the sum 
of individual profits, since vg is received as soon as any firm 
succeeds. 
J
-rl� 
-Lhi(xkl)� � S � e e [Lhi <xu>Vo + � - L�l]d� 
[lhi(xkl)Vg + � - }xkl]/[rl + lhi(xkl)] , 
The objective of the cooperative firms is to maximize v;cx1) 
nl 
by their choice of x1 e 
[O,m) I.� interior maximizer x: is 
implicitly defined b y  the first-order conditions: for i = 1,2 , , , ,n1, 
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o. (25) 
Alternatively, (25) can be solved to yield 
and 
Equation (26) implies that h1•cx:1>vg - 1 l 0 while (27) implies 
r1vg - � + }x:1 > 0, A second-order necessary condition is 
(26) 
(27) 
In view of the symmetry of the firms, it seems clear that any 
jointly optimal investment decision with one innovation remaining will 
be symmetric. That is, x:1 = x;1 for all i,j, Denote this common 
value x81 and let v: = v;cx;>. 
Proposition 13. With one innovation remaining, the investment rate of 
the noncooperative incumbent is no less than the joint profit 
maximizing rate, A fortiori, the noncooperative noncinumbents invest 
more than the joint prof it maximizing rate, Formally, 
Proof, From equation (5), vf = [h1•(xil)V� - l]/�'(xil)' while (26) 
implies V� = Ch1•cx81>vg - 1]/�'(xs1>. Since vg = V�, and since it 
must be that v: l vf (the incumbent can do no better than if it also 
had the cooperation of its rivals) 
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(30) 
I -The function [�'(x)V0 -
1]/�'(x) is decreasing in x for x l x1•
Since both x81 and x11 are at least�· it follows that x11 l xSl' 
Q,E,D. 
Thus even though the incumbent invests less than the 
nonincumbents, it still invests too much relative to the joint profit 
maximum. 
Stau t 2 
When two innovations remain, joint profits ar� 
1 -r2� -2bi<xk2)� � S � V�(X2) = d e e [Lbi(xt 2>V1 + � - L�21d� 
= [lbi(xk2)V: + � - l�2)/[r2 + lbi<xk2)], 
That is, the firms (jointly) receive revenue a� the flow rate R2, pay 
out R and D costs at the rate lx�2, and experience the constant 
aggregate hazard rate of success lbi(xk2) at � so long as no one has 
succeeded before time �. 
At the joint profit maximizing vector X�, the following 
equalities obtain. 
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8V�(X�)/oxi2 [r2 + lbi(xk2)J[h2'(x:2>v: -
1)
- [lbi<x:2>v: + � - LX:2Jh2'<x:2> = o. (30) 
Alternatively, 
(31) 
and 
( 32) 
Equation (31) implies h2•(x:2>v: - 1 l 0 and (32) implies
Finally, the second-order necesaary condition 
is 
s -implying that xi2 2. x2, 
Again, it seems clear that x�2 = xj2 = x82 for all i,j. 
(33) 
S s( s) Define V2 = V2 x2 , Unfortunately, we cannot follow Proposition 13 to
S I prove that x12 l xs2• since now v1 2. v1• That is, for any value V, 
xs2<v> i x12<V) by the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 
S I 13, But since V1 l V1, it is not clear whether or not
S I xs2<V1) l x12<V1>• 
Stage t 
The t-stage analysis follows that of t = 2 exactly. The 
first-order condition 
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can be differentiated totally and solved for the comparative statics 
Proposition 14, The joint profit maximizing rate of investment 
increases with an increase in the discount rate (rt) and the maximum 
joint profit available in the next period (V�_1), and decreases with 
an increase in the current revenue flow (Rt). The expression ax8t/ant 
has the same sign as ht
'(xst>xst - ht(xst>• 
s Proposition lS, Suppose that Rt ( rtVt-l and 
ht'(O) l 1/(V�-l - Rt/rt), Then there exists a unique xSt (� which 
maximizes joint profits. Moreover, xSt satisfies the first-order 
condition (30), 
The proof follows that of Proposition 12. Under the 
hypotheses of Proposition 15, BV�/axSt starts out positive, changes 
sign exactly once and becomes negative for finite xSt' 
l 
